We show that the presence of loss aversion on the part of participantsin a Tullock imperfectly discriminating contest will significantlyreduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resourcesused up in the competition for that rent...

Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectlydiscriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rentdissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a productionfunction with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria...

The rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980) has stimulated a large literature on rent-seekingcontests, of which Hillman (1989) and Nitzan (1994) provide useful surveys. AlthoughTullock's 'winner take all' model has been adapted and extended in numerous ways, thereremain fundamental modeling issues,...