Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on ca- pacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncer- tain. We study the following market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) sep- arated duopoly with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142329
We examine welfare e ffects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142375
We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and retail prices in the electricity industry. Allowing for uncertain demand, we compare three market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142377
This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142389
An important conclusion from the literature on hydropower is that if there are no other constraints than the available water reservoirs for a year, and operating costs are ignored, the competitive (and socially optimal) outcome is characterized by the (present value) price being constant through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603297
The Fukushima disaster has lead the French government to release novel cost information relative to its nuclear electricity program allowing us to compute a levelized cost. We identify a modest escalation of capital cost and a larger than expected operational cost. Under the best scenario, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011079144
This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662098