We provide a framework for analysing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We introduce the concepts of essentially monotone decreasing (EMD) and increasing (EMI) functions, which generalize the respective mono-tonicity properties. If the profit...

We use cumulative reaction functions to compare long-run market structures in aggregative oligopoly games. We first compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The aggregator stays the same, despite changes in the number of firms...

This Paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that a net revenue maximizing government has a stronger incentive to restructure than a profit maximizing acquiring firm: A restructuring firm only takes into...

We consider a market in which a public firm competes against private firms, and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized. In the short run, privatization is harmful because all prices rise; the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost. In the long run, privatization leads to...

This Paper determines the equilibrium market structure in a mixed international oligopoly, where the state enterprise's assets are sold at an auction. The model suggests that low greenfield costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions. The intuition is that domestic firms can then not...

Producers of cultural goods and media products can only make their specific contents available to their audiences and readerships through a particular language. The choice of language is a trivial decision if consumers are monolingual. However, the fraction of bilingual consumers is high in some...

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I...

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition and derive a complete characterization of the market equilibrium based on an Arrow-Pratt measure of concavity of the utility, interpreted as the relative love for variety. When the relative love for variety increases with the consumption...

This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert’s repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behaviour of...

We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive...