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Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Technological adoption in health care

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Martinez-Giralt, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558590

Public and Private Provision of Health Care

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Martinez-Giralt, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

One of the mechanisms that is implemented in the cost containment wave in the health-care sectors in western countries … reimbursement scheme when decisions on prices and qualities are taken simultaneously (that we relate to primary health-care sectors … solution when decisions are sequential (specialized health-care sector). We also derive some normative conclusions on the way …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123706

Moral Hazard and the Demand for Health Services: A Matching Estimator Approach

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Machado, Matilde Pinto; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We estimate the impact of health insurance coverage beyond National Health Insurance on the demand for several health … on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. We … argue this insurance is exogenous i.e. not correlated with beneficiaries’ health status. This identifying assumption allows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124045

Waiting Lists and Patient Selection

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

characterization of patient selection. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114406

Equilibrium Incentive Contracts

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers’ output but not their effort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791700

Does Poaching Distort Training?

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661864