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Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing

Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland; Suetens, Sigrid - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991543

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases

Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666424

Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498161

Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084654

Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm

Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study the regulation of a utility firm which is active in a competitive unregulated sector as well. If the firm … and quantity competition) and also optimal regulation. Accounting for the several effects of regulation on the unregulated … market, we show the existence of an informational externality, in that regulation provides useful information to the rival …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124135

Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a "National Champion"

Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze the design of optimal regulation of a domestic monopolist that also competes in an unregulated foreign … market. We show how foreign activities by the regulated firm affect domestic regulation, consumers’ surplus and firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504706

Competition with exclusive contracts and market-share discounts

Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the effects of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned on the share a firm receives of the customer’s total purchases) in an adverse selection model where firms supply differentiated products and compete in non-linear prices. We show that exclusive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502577

Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets

Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the foreclosed care provider remains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491723

Competitive quantity discounts

Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We analyze the effects of competition with quantity discounts in a duopoly model with asymmetric firms. Consumers are privately informed about demand, so firms use quantity discounts as a price discrimination device. However, a dominant firm may also use quantity discounts to weaken or eliminate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784721

Exclusive contracts and market dominance

Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We develop a theory of exclusive dealing that rehabilitates pre-Chicago-school analyses. Our theory rests on two realistic assumptions: that firms are imperfectly informed about demand, and that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals. Under those assumptions, exclusive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084291