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Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468555

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper considers a housing insurance market in which buildings have different damage probabilities. Insurers use … imperfect tests to find out about buildings’ damage types. The insurance market is a natural monopoly. If more than one insurer …. First we show that the natural insurance monopoly need not be sustainable. Then we show that in the equilibrium industry …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123854

Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees they get an upscale premium if the case is won, which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose between a safe and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661624

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661858

Equilibrium Incentive Contracts

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers’ output but not their effort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791700

Does Poaching Distort Training?

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661864