Similar Search Results

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Reference-Dependent Preferences and Loss Aversion: A Discrete Choice Experiment In the Health-Care Sector

Neuman, Einat; Neuman, Shoshana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

A Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) in the health-care sector is used to test the loss aversion theory that is derived … with non-tangible attributes. A health-care event is used for empirical illustration: The loss aversion theory is tested …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792351

Explorations of the Effect of Experience on Preferences: Two Health-Care Case Studies

Neuman, Einat; Neuman, Shoshana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

experience on preferences for attributes of health-care events. We are using two very different samples and a methodology that … facilitates the estimation of marginal utilities of various attributes of a composite non-traded health-care service. Discrete … is that preferences for health-care attributes are significantly changed as a result of experience with the health event …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123715

Explorations of the Effect of Experience on Preferences for a Health-Care Service

Neuman, Einat; Neuman, Shoshana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

as experience is accumulated. This paper tests the effect of experience with a health-care service on preferences for … basic findings are that preferences change significantly as a result of experience with the health event; that the effect of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656214

Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about … their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449

Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084544

Equilibrium Incentive Contracts

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers’ output but not their effort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791700

Competition with Local Network Externalities

Fjeldstad, Øystein; Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Local network externalities are present when the utility of buying from a firm not only depends on the number of other customers (global network externalities), but also on their identity and/or characteristics. We explore the consequences of local network externalities within a framework where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530382

Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Suppose an altruistic person - A - is willing to transfer resources to a second person - B - if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents’ point of view. This is the Samaritan’s dilemma. The logic of the dilemma has been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497793

Efficient Exclusion

Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In an important paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497799