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A Model Of Market-Enhancing Infrastructure

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

asymmetric firms, restructuring, and entry. We show how these welfare effects depend on the initial level of market development …, and restructuring and entry costs. The model generates an endogenous demand for infrastructure investment, and the … simulate the relative welfare effects of reducing transport, restructuring and entry costs, and we evaluate in each case the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656176

Competition, Entry, and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

incentives for relatively low-cost firms to enter the market, and thus improves the efficiency of the entry process. The … among firms, the proportion of high-cost firms, the cost of restructuring, and entry costs for new firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667044

Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform

Orszag, Mike; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This proposal involves the establishment of ‘welfare accounts’ for every person in a country. There are four accounts: a retirement account (covering pensions), an unemployment account (covering unemployment support), a human capital account (covering education and training), and a health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661484

Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets: a Differential-Game Approach

Brekke, Kurt Richard; Cellini, Roberto; Siciliani, Luigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504502

Infection, Acquired Immunity and Externalities in Treatment

Toxvaerd, Flavio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper considers a model of infectious disease, such as swine flu, in which privately costly treatment confers immunity on recovered individuals. It is shown that under decentralized decision making, infected individuals ignore the externality that their treatment has on susceptible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784738

Recurrent Infection and Externalities in Prevention

Toxvaerd, Flavio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper studies a model of disease propagation in which agents can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive behavior. Agents are assumed to be fully rational, strategically sophisticated and forward-looking. I show that on the transition path, optimal behavior is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784740

The Optimal Control of Infectious Diseases via Prevention and Treatment

Rowthorn, Robert; Toxvaerd, Flavio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper fully characterizes the optimal control of a recurrent infectious disease through the use of (non-vaccine) prevention and treatment. The dynamic system may admit multiple steady states and the optimal policy may be path dependent. We find that an optimal path cannot end at a point...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083552