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A Model Of Market-Enhancing Infrastructure

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

asymmetric firms, restructuring, and entry. We show how these welfare effects depend on the initial level of market development …, and restructuring and entry costs. The model generates an endogenous demand for infrastructure investment, and the … simulate the relative welfare effects of reducing transport, restructuring and entry costs, and we evaluate in each case the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656176

Competition, Entry, and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

incentives for relatively low-cost firms to enter the market, and thus improves the efficiency of the entry process. The … among firms, the proportion of high-cost firms, the cost of restructuring, and entry costs for new firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667044

Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083497

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400

Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792544

Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform

Orszag, Mike; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This proposal involves the establishment of ‘welfare accounts’ for every person in a country. There are four accounts: a retirement account (covering pensions), an unemployment account (covering unemployment support), a human capital account (covering education and training), and a health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661484

Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets: a Differential-Game Approach

Brekke, Kurt Richard; Cellini, Roberto; Siciliani, Luigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504502