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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

While financial liberalization has in general favourable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666751

Competition, Entry, and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

incentives for relatively low-cost firms to enter the market, and thus improves the efficiency of the entry process. The … among firms, the proportion of high-cost firms, the cost of restructuring, and entry costs for new firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667044

A Model Of Market-Enhancing Infrastructure

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

asymmetric firms, restructuring, and entry. We show how these welfare effects depend on the initial level of market development …, and restructuring and entry costs. The model generates an endogenous demand for infrastructure investment, and the … simulate the relative welfare effects of reducing transport, restructuring and entry costs, and we evaluate in each case the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656176

Why Governments Tax or Subsidize Trade: Evidence From Agriculture

Gawande, Kishore; Hoekman, Bernard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper empirically explores the political-economic determinants of why governments choose to tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. We use a new data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a number of commodities spanning the last four decades for 64 countries. NRAs measure the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530343

The Political Economy of International Unions

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Etro, Federico - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666614

International Unions

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Etro, Federico - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policy-making endogenously determines size, composition and scope...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791323

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612

What Does the European Union Do?

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Schuknecht, Ludger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124230

Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics

Grossman, Gene; Helpman, Elhanan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136600

Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform

Orszag, Mike; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This proposal involves the establishment of ‘welfare accounts’ for every person in a country. There are four accounts: a retirement account (covering pensions), an unemployment account (covering unemployment support), a human capital account (covering education and training), and a health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661484