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Competition, Entry, and the Social Returns to Infrastructure in Transition Economies

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

incentives for relatively low-cost firms to enter the market, and thus improves the efficiency of the entry process. The … among firms, the proportion of high-cost firms, the cost of restructuring, and entry costs for new firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667044

A Model Of Market-Enhancing Infrastructure

Aghion, Philippe; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

asymmetric firms, restructuring, and entry. We show how these welfare effects depend on the initial level of market development …, and restructuring and entry costs. The model generates an endogenous demand for infrastructure investment, and the … simulate the relative welfare effects of reducing transport, restructuring and entry costs, and we evaluate in each case the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656176

Public Action for Public Goods

Banerjee, Abhijit; Iyer, Lakshmi; Somanathan, Rohini - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662369

Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Schnitzer, Monika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper discusses the economic merits of direct or indirect governmental support for open source projects. Software markets differ from standard textbook markets in three important respects that may give rise to market failures: (i) large economies of scale, (ii) crucially important...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667093

Debt-sensitive Majority Rules

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans; Grimm, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468567

Civil War, Public Goods and the Social Wealth of Nations

Kanbur, Ravi; Pottebaum, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper establishes and explores the implications of a somewhat surprising empirical finding. Although civil war adversely affects the performance of social indicators in general, poorer countries lose less, in absolute and relative terms, than richer countries. It is argued that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123856

Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

Cripps, Martin William; Keller, R Godfrey; Rady, Sven - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a pay-off only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124141

Where Are the Real Bottlenecks? Evidence from 20,000 Firms in 60 Countries About the Shadow Costs of Constraints to Firm Performance

Carlin, Wendy; Schaffer, Mark E; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We use data from over 20,000 firms in 60 countries to identify constraints on the growth of firms. We interpret managers’ answers to survey questions on the extent to which various aspects of their external environment inhibit the performance of their firm as measuring the shadow cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124336

Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics

Grossman, Gene; Helpman, Elhanan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136600

Diversity and the Power of the Elites in Democratic Societies: A model and a test.

Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor- agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611020