The first part of the paper analyzes the inflationary risks associated with price liberalization, the welfare costs of inflation and the difficulties of East European central banks in pursuing non-inflationary policies. The main obstacles are the low credibility of stabilization policies and a...

Using indirect inference based on a VAR we confront US data from 1972 to 2007 with a standard New Keynesian model in which an optimal timeless policy is substituted for a Taylor rule. We find the model explains the data both for the Great Acceleration and the Great Moderation. The implication is...

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the Spanish economy, over the period 1977-97, on whether monetary policy shocks have had different effects on real output growth depending on the state of the business cycle. To do so, we adopt an extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov Switching...

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the open economy aspects of the 'delegation game' in which the operation of monetary policy is delegated to independent and `conservative' central bankers with a greater dislike of inflation than the public. When all countries optimally and...

In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization...

It is sometimes argued that central banks influence the private economy in the short run through controlling a specific component of high powered money, not its total amount. Using a structural VAR approach, this paper evaluates this claim empirically, in the context of the Japanese economy. It...

A small open economy model is presented, which allows explicit treatment of uncertainty and its effects on macroeconomic behaviour. Inflation targeting is compared to the welfare maximizing monetary rule and to a fixed nominal exchange rate. It is found that flexible inflation targeting produces...

Historical experience suggests that the distribution of monetary policy authority among the members of a monetary union is a key aspect of the design of a central bank constitution. We analyse alternative institutional solutions to that problem with different degrees of centralization of...

Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become very transparent. This paper provides an explanation for this puzzling fact, focusing on the disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and gives the...

This paper uses a DSGE model to examine the effects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap. The spending multiplier can be much larger than in the normal situation if the liquidity trap is very prolonged, and the budgetary costs minimal. But given this "fiscal free lunch," it...