The paper establishes that sovereigns, like banks, need a lender of last resort (LoLR). In the euro area the ECB, with its estimated €3.4 trillion non-inflationary loss absorption capacity, is the only credible sovereign LoLR. The ECB/Eurosystem has been acting as sovereign LoLR through its...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when (i) surplus banks providing liquidity have market power, (ii) there are frictions in the lending market due to moral hazard, and (iii) assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside...

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity...

The recent financial crisis teaches important lessons regarding the lender-of-last resort function. Large swap lines extended in 2007-08 from the Federal Reserve to other central banks show that the classic concept of a national last-resort lender fails to address key vulnerabilities in a...

Bailout expectations have led banks to behave imprudently, holding too little capital and relying too much on short term funding to finance long term investments. This paper presents a model to rationalize a constructive ambiguity approach to liquidity assistance as a solution to forbearance....

Building on Calvo (1988), we develop a stochastic monetary economy in which government default may be driven by either self-fulfilling expectations or weak fundamentals, and explore conditions under which central banks can rule out the former. We analyze monetary backstops resting on the ability...

In this paper we trace the evolution of the lender of last resort doctrine—and its implementation—from the nineteenth century through the panic of 2008. We find that typically the most influential economists “fight the last war”: formulating policy guidelines that would have dealt...

The provision of liquidity by international institutions such as the IMF to countries experiencing balance of payment problems could prevent liquidity runs but could also cause moral hazard distortions: expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, debtor countries would have weak incentives to...

Central banks can go broke and have done so, although mainly in developing countries. The conventional balance sheet of the central bank is uninformative about the financial resources it has at its disposal and about its ability to act as an effective lender of last resort and market marker of...

The rapid growth of international reserves|a development concentrated in the emerging markets|remains a puzzle. In this paper we suggest that a model based on financial stability and financial openness goes far toward explaining reserve holdings in the modern era of globalized capital markets....