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Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes
Conconi, Paola; DeRemer, David; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276379
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Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies
Alesina, Alberto F; Cohen, Gerald D; Roubini, Nouriel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992
`loose' fiscal policy prior to elections. Fourth, inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666821
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Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning versus Re-election Concerns
Le Borgne, Eric; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
becomes a more accurate signal of their ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may … more than offset the positive ‘re-election concerns’ effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment …. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792465
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Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation
Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547
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So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems
Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305
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Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy across Political Regimes
Galasso, Vincenzo; Nunnari, Salvatore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466353
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A Framework for Analysing the Political Support for Active Labour Market Policy
Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
We develop a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of active labour market policy on unemployment, wages and the welfare of the employed. This framework is used to assess the political support in favour of such policies and to relate it to the working of such policies and other parameters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662144
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A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545
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Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issue Dimensions
Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
Different electoral rules provide different incentives for parties competing for votes to adopt emerging issues. As a result, new societal issues will be integrated at different speeds into the political arena, and ultimately, into policy. In order to study this question formally, I propose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666941
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Lobbying competition over trade policy
Gawande, Kishore; Krishna, Pravin; Olarreaga, Marcelo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991547