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Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks' remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank's top executives, and why...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084687

Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis

Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The paper studies the causes of the current financial crisis and considers proposals for mitigation and prevention of future crises. The crisis is was the product of a ‘perfect storm’ bringing together a number of microeconomic and macroeconomic pathologies. Among the microeconomic systemic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791213

A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral

Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates this inefficiency by 'flattening' the local lender’s payoff …-à-vis transaction lenders lead to higher collateral requirements, thus strengthening the role of collateral in local lending …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123922

Collateral, Default Risk, and Relationship Lending: An Empirical Study on Financial Contracting

Krahnen, Jan Pieter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper provides new insights into the nature of relationship lending by analysing the role of collateral and its … indicate that the use of collateral in loan contracts is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiation … risk. Relationship lenders do require more collateral from their debtors than normal lenders for two main reasons. First …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123985

Bidding and Performance in Repo Auctions: Evidence from ECB Open Market Operations

Bindseil, Ulrich; Nyborg, Kjell G; Strebulaev, Ilya - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

bidders are more concerned with the loser’s nightmare, collateral, and future interest rate reductions by the ECB. Small and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067452

Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies

Bolton, Patrick; Jeanne, Olivier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003147

The Macroeconomics of Money Market Freezes

Bruche, Max; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model in which money markets provide structural funding to some banks. When bank default risk becomes significant, retail deposit insurance creates an asymmetry between banks that operate in savings-rich regions, which can remain financed at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991546

Policies for Banking Crises: A Theoretical Framework

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper analyses the effects on ex ante risk-shifting incentives and ex post fiscal costs of three policies that are frequently used in dealing with banking crises, namely, forbearance from prudential regulations, extension of blanket deposit guarantees, and provision of unrestricted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791329

Liquidity, Risk-Taking and the Lender of Last Resort

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791539

A Model of Takeovers of Foreign Banks

Repullo, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This Paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter. Each bank is initially supervised by a national agency that cares about closure costs and deposit insurance payouts, and may decide the early closure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792374

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