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The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084007
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Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia
Edmans, Alex; Fang, Vivian; Lewellen, Katharina A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. These concerns depend on the amount of equity he intends to sell in the short-term, but actual equity sales are an endogenous decision. We use the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084396
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hamdani, Assaf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656367
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Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach
Lindbeck, Assar; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1987
wages of the underbidders. The resulting labor turnover costs create economic rent which the insiders tap in wage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791249
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Skewness in Stock Returns, Periodic Cash Payouts, and Investor Heterogeneity
Albuquerque, Rui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of periodic cash payouts within the context of a stationary rational expectations model with heterogeneous investors. The periodicity of cash payouts provides a natural motivation for time-varying conditional volatility in stock returns. I show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491716
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Men at Work in a Land Down-under
Booth, Alison; Katic, Pamela - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2008
We use new training data from waves 3-6 of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey to investigate the training and wages of full-time men. We explore the extent to which the data are consistent with the predictions of human capital theory or with recent alternative theories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004971374
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Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of Unemployment
Güell, Maia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts. Since then their labour markets have become more dynamic. This Paper studies the implications of such reforms for the duration distribution of unemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the duration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123695
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The Effects of Globalization on Worker Training
Gersbach, Hans; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We examine how globalization affects firms’ incentives to provide general worker training. We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, firms invest in productivity-enhancing training. In stage 2, they can make wage offers for each others’ workers. Finally, Cournot competition takes place....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124275