Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers. Each buyer either has hard information about his valuation (i.e., evidence that cannot be forged) or is ignorant. The optimal mechanism is characterized. It turns out that more ignorance can increase the...

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...

We study the effects of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned on the share a firm receives of the customer’s total purchases) in an adverse selection model where firms supply differentiated products and compete in non-linear prices. We show that exclusive...

One way to understand the value of sporting ‘superstars’ is to examine the effect they have on match attendances and revenue. Arguably, the most famous sports star in Australia was Sir Donald Bradman, whose batting average has far exceeded that of any cricket players. This paper examines the...

We study optimal price setting by a monopolist in an infinite horizon model with stochastic costs, moderate inflation, and costly price adjustment. For realistic parameters, chosen to replicate observed frequencies of price changes, the model fits numerically several empirical regularities. In...

Models of product differentiation typically assume a demand for variety. This paper derives the demand for variety in a model where a representative consumer chooses how many specialised varieties to purchase for the pursuit of different activities. In contrast with previous models this...

Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at different prices to reflect the various levels of seating categories available. Here we consider how two product characteristics (the artist’s age and venue capacity) influence the likelihood that pop music concert tickets will be sold...

When a monopolist asks consumers to choose a particular nonlinear tariff option, consumers do not completely know their type. Their valuations of the good and/or optimal quantity purchases are only fully realized after the optional tariff has been subscribed. In order to characterize the menu of...

In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the same product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning...

This paper considers a housing insurance market in which buildings have different damage probabilities. Insurers use imperfect tests to find out about buildings’ damage types. The insurance market is a natural monopoly. If more than one insurer is active, high risk house owners continue to...