With applied work in mind, we define an equilibrium notion for dynamic games with asymmetric information which does not require a specification for players' beliefs about their opponent types. This enables us to define equilibrium conditions which, at least in principal, are testable and can be...

This paper provides a step-by-step guide to solving dynamic stochastic games using the homotopy method. The homotopy method facilitates exploring the equilibrium correspondence in a systematic fashion; it is especially useful in games that have multiple equilibria. We discuss the theory of the...

This paper studies the diffusion of a new technology that is brought to market while its potential is still uncertain. We consider a dynamic game in which firms improve both a new and a rival old technology while learning about the relative potential of both technologies. We use the model to...

This paper explores the equilibrium correspondence of a dynamic quality ladder model with entry and exit using the homotopy method. The homotopy method facilitates exploring the equilibrium correspondence in a systematic fashion; it is ideally suited for investigating the economic phenomena that...

We present a framework for the applied analysis of dynamic games with asymmetric information. The framework consists of a definition of equilibrium, and an algorithm to compute it. Our definition of Applied Markov Perfect equilibrium is an extension of the definition of Markov Perfect...

The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games is presented as the appropriate tool to model complementarities. The approach, which has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard toolbox of researchers, makes the analysis intuitive and simple, helps in deriving new...

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...

This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. We show that while the possibility of waiting longer for others'’ actions helps agents to coordinate in the good equilibrium, the option of delaying one’s' actions harms...