Showing 1 - 10 of 16
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services. We assume that providers can increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort (upcoding or DRG creep). We derive and compare the optimal price and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661727
Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients' right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293984
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404
We study the relationship between competition and quality within a spatial competition framework where firms compete in prices and quality. We generalise existing literature on spatial price-quality competition along several dimensions, including utility functions that are non-linear in income...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068287
We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498167
We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504502
In many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In this paper we study semi-altruistic firms’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865972
In a spatial competition setting there is usually a non-negative relationship between competition and quality. In this paper we offer a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083218
We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effoort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083526