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On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible outcomes is taken as … before they bargain over which of them is selected. Our objective is to understand how different bargaining institutions … affect the incentives to disclose possible solutions to the bargaining problem, where inefficiency may arise when both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854532
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Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter
Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying mechanism, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer’s expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123964
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Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium
Drugov, Mikhail - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083946
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Procurement when Price and Quality Matter
Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying procedure, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer's expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661783
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A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments
Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
power. When parties are risk-averse, a self-enforcing peace agreement may not be feasible. The bargaining power of the …Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114441
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The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments
Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in general training when labour markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in specific training...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666647
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Durable Goods with Quality Differentiation
Inderst, Roman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
their product and price policy sufficiently rapidly - which reduces their commitment power - we find that the whole market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789022
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Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination
Hoppe, Heidrun C.; Moldovanu, Benny; Ozdenoren, Emre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We study two-sided markets with heterogeneous, privately informed agents who gain from being matched with better partners from the other side. Agents are matched through an intermediary. Our main results quantify the relative attractiveness of a coarse matching scheme consisting of two classes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792482
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Open Covenants, Privately Arrived At
Fingleton, John; Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper analyses strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The … principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the … bargaining behaviour. We compare two different scenarios: open-door bargaining, where the principals observe the entire …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067665
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Renegotiation Before Contract Execution
Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504482