Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 143
Cover Image
Elections with Contribution-Maximizing Candidates
Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
Much of the analysis of campaign contributions, in accordance with the Downsian model, has supposed that candidates seek contributions for electoral purposes. This paper takes the opposite approach, by assuming that each candidate aims to maximize the contributions he collects. We let a citizen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788909
Cover Image
Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare
Hindricks, Jean; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how … public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indifferent about the fiscal regime. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504327
Cover Image
Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes
Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if … copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout … flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084114
Cover Image
Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky
Luque, Jaime; Morelli, Massimo; Tavares, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Inspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this paper provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the common good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. We highlight the importance of institutional design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283396
Cover Image
Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes
Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534095
Cover Image
The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget
Kauppi, Heikki; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972167
Cover Image
Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing
Grüner, Hans Peter; Schulte, Elisabeth - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
A group of P identical managers has to make a choice between N alternatives. They benefit from reaching the decision quickly. In order to learn which is the best option, the alternatives have to be compared. A manager is able to identify the better one of two alternatives only with a certain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123798
Cover Image
The Affectionate Society: Does Competition for Partners Promote Friendliness?
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123880
Cover Image
Inequality and Informality
Chong, Alberto; Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
This paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal sector. We propose a simple theoretical model in which it is positively related to income inequality, more so under weak institutions, and is negatively related to the economy's wealth. These predictions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123893
Cover Image
The Stability Threshold and Two Facts of Polarization
Haimanko, Ori; Le Breton, Michel; Weber, Shlomo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
In this paper we introduce the notion of stability threshold that quantifies the minimal returns to size sufficient to prevent credible secession threats by regions of the country. Severity of internal tension has been linked to degree of polarization of citizens' preferences and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123952