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Elections with Contribution-Maximizing Candidates

Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Much of the analysis of campaign contributions, in accordance with the Downsian model, has supposed that candidates seek contributions for electoral purposes. This paper takes the opposite approach, by assuming that each candidate aims to maximize the contributions he collects. We let a citizen...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788909

Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare

Hindricks, Jean; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how … public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indifferent about the fiscal regime. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504327

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if … copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout … flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084114

EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe

Baldwin, Richard; Berglöf, Erik; Giavazzi, Francesco; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This Paper contributes ideas and analysis to the ongoing EU reform debate. It consists of three distinct parts: voting in the Council of Ministers, restructuring the ECB's Governing Council, and the setting of enlargement “examination” dates. The IGC currently focuses on Council voting,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504315

Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation

Blundell, Richard William; Chiappori, Pierre-André; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We present identification and estimation results for the 'collective' model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours and non-participation in employment. We derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504396

The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State

Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups of by for-profit entrepreneurs: kings, lords, or mafia dons. Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504400

Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part II: Risk Sharing and Redistribution

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

The paper studies the political and economic determinants of inter-regional public transfers. It points to an important difference between two alternative federal fiscal constitutions. The paper shows that inter-regional transfers can be determined either by a federation-wide vote over a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504413

Biases of Professional Exchange Rate Forecasts: Psychological Explanations and an Experimentally-Based Comparison to Novices

Bofinger, Peter; Leitner, Johannes; Schmidt, Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The empirical performance of macroeconomic exchange rate models is more than disappointing. This dismal result is also reflected in the forecasting capabilities of professional analysts: all in all, analysts are not in a position to beat naïve random walk forecasts. The root for this deficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504428

On Robust Constitution Design

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies

Drazen, Allan; Limão, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504570