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Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts
Segev, Ella; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study a sequential all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the first mover) makes an effort in the first period, while contestant 2 (the second mover)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854484
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Effective Political Contests
Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307
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Optimal Rewards in Contests
Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501
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Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366
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All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545
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All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality
Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454
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Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions
Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485
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Contests with Ties
Cohen, Daniel; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524
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Procuring Innovation
Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
To stay on top of global competition, firms and governments often need to acquire innovative goods and services, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875
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Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints
Megidish, Reut; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509466