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Subjective Welfare, Isolation and Relative Consumption
Fafchamps, Marcel; Shilpi, Forhad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The recent literature has shown that subjective welfare depends on relative income. Attempts to test this relationship in poor countries have yielded conflicting results, suggesting that the relationship is not universal or only applies above a certain income level. We revisit the issue using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792353
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A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth
Carlin, Wendy; Schaffer, Mark E; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
competition in market economies. We find evidence of the importance of a minimum of rivalry in both innovation and growth: the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067370
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The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments
Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of …-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the … conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225959
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Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm …; this may increase the cost of deterrence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745
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Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
Di Porto, Edoardo; Persico, Nicola; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement … positive question. It proposes a game-theoretic model of decentralized deterrence and an empirical test, based on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083887
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The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue
Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408
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Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence
Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find … for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272717
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Payment Evasion
Buehler, Stefan; Halbheer, Daniel; Lechner, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper models payment evasion as a source of profit by letting the firm choose the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders. For a given price and fine, the consumers purchase, evade payment, or choose the outside option. We show that payment evasion leads to a form of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276378
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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
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Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco; Polo, Michele - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000438