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Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single … objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667050

Optimal Allocations in Round-Robin Tournaments

Krumer, Alex; Megidish, Reut; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. The player who wins in two matches wins the tournament. We characterize the sub …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083965

The Impact of the Droit de Suite in the UK: An Empirical Analysis

Banternghansa, Chanont; Graddy, Kathryn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

changes in the UK auction market for art that is subject to the Droit de Suite (DDS), relative to changes for art not subject … to the DDS, and also relative to changes in the auction markets for art in countries where there has been no change in … impact on the UK art auction market. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662156

On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

den Berg, Gerard J van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789129

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jehiel, Philippe; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661614

Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Schnitzer, Monika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

The paper surveys recent results of auction theory, bargaining theory and political economy in order to compare …, such as the traditional English auction. In particular, if there are more than two serious bidders, an English auction is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666841

Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions

Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best …-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending … (they have different values) the best-of-three all-pay auction is less competitive (the difference between the players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485

Optimal Rewards in Contests

Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and effort. We analyse the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the multiplicatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501

Contests with Ties

Cohen, Daniel; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524

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