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Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem

Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504573

Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State

Mayshar, Joram; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We propose a general theory that explains the extent of the state and accounts for related institutions as byproducts of the state's extractive technology. We posit further that this extractive technology is determined by the transparency of the production technology. This theory is applied to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283392

Geography, Transparency and Institutions

Mayshar, Joram; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross-regional differences in the scale of the state, in its hierarchical structure, and in property rights over land. The key linkage between geography and these institutions, we posit, is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083761

Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships

Francesconi, Marco; Muthoo, Abhinay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792544

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

Bénabou, Roland; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We analyze the joint dynamics of religious beliefs, scientific progress and coalitional politics along both religious and economic lines. History offers many examples of the recurring tensions between science and organized religion, but as part of the paper’s motivating evidence we also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262883

The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and Development

Xu, Cheng-Gang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

resist reforms, policies, rules and laws. China’s reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468688

Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

This paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralization of power in government as a problem in … has nothing to say about the decentralization of power as such. The model of this paper compares allocations of power to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792514

Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating …. The efficiency of decentralization and the performance of 'constitutional rules' (such as majority voting) which may be … used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework. Stronger externalities and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789145

Making Democracy Work: Culture, Social Capital and Elections in China

Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy; Xu, Yiqing; Yao, Yang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper aims to show that culture is an important determinant of the effectiveness of formal democratic institutions, such as elections. We collect new data to document the presence of voluntary and social organizations and the history of electoral reforms in Chinese villages. We use the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213313

Debt-sensitive Majority Rules

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans; Grimm, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468567

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