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contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791548
earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show … ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124335
group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656168
which the player expending the greater resources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661937
explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504736
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082545
This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals. By exploiting variation in terror attacks over time and across locations in Israel from 1988 to 2006, we show that local terror attacks cause Israelis to be: (i) more willing to grant territorial concessions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458294
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666486
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789151
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251