We analyse the effect of concealing limit order traders’ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to...

We study changes in liquidity following the introduction of a new electronic limit order market when, prior to its introduction, trading is centralized in a single limit order market. We also study how automation of routing decisions and trading fees affect the relative liquidity of rival...

We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by firms wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All firms prefer lower costs, however firms differ in how they value a decrease in trading...

Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative...

We develop a model of price formation in a dealership market where monitoring of the information flow requires costly effort. The result is imperfect monitoring, which creates profit opportunities for speculators, who do not act as dealers but simply monitor the information flow and quote...

We show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness. This theory of cross-listings yields a rich set of new predictions. In particular, it implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices should be larger for...

We develop a dynamic model of a market with two specialized sides: traders posting quotes ("market makers") and traders hitting quotes ("market takers"). Traders monitor the market to seize profit opportunities, generating high frequency liquidity cycles. Monitoring decisions by market-makers...

This paper analyses the impact of a minimum price variation (tick) and time priority on the quote dynamics and on trading costs when competition for the order flow is dynamic. It finds that convergence to competitive prices can take time and that the speed of convergence is influenced by the...

This paper provides a game theoretic model of price formation and order placement decisions in a dynamic limit order market. Investors can choose to post limit orders or to submit market orders. Limit orders result in better execution prices but face a risk of non-execution and a winner’s...

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational...