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Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium
Gromb, Denis; Scharfstein, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established firms … can arise (and sometimes coexist). In a low (high) entrepreneurship equilibrium, the market for failed entrepreneurs is … (entrepreneurship). We also characterize conditions under which there can be too little or too much entrepreneurial activity in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789057
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Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance
Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance in the ‘New Economy’. Instead of traditional performance we use firm survival on the stock market as the performance indicator. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504269
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Financial Signalling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs
Audretsch, David B; Bönte, Werner; Mahagaonkar, Prashanth - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Innovative new ventures fail if they cannot attract resources needed to commercialise new ideas and inventions. Obtaining external resources is a central issue for nascent entrepreneurs - people who are in the process of starting new ventures. We argue in this paper that, a way to deal with this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656288
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico C; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662100
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Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis
Bolton, Patrick; Freixas, Xavier; Gambacorta, Leonardo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them to provide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the services they provide, operating costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083688
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When Arm’s Length Is Too Far. Relationship Banking over the Business Cycle
Beck, Thorsten; de Haas, Ralph; Degryse, Hans; Van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Using a novel way to identify relationship and transaction banks, we study how banks’ lending techniques affect funding to SMEs over the business cycle. For 21 countries we link the lending techniques that banks use in the direct vicinity of firms to these firms’ credit constraints at two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083851
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The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation
Repullo, Rafael; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We develop and calibrate a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period and the business cycle is a Markov process that determines loans' probabilities of default. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084391
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Multiple Versus Single Banking Relationships
Detragiache, Enrica; Garella, Paolo; Guiso, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
This paper develops a theoretical model in which firms may choose multiple banking relationships to reduce the risk that financing will be denied by ‘relationship banks’ should the latter experience liquidity problems and refuse to roll over lines of credit. The inability to refinance from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504283
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The Procyclical Effects of Basel II
Repullo, Rafael; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We analyze the cyclical effects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive (Basel II) capital requirements in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666764
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Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs: Theory and Evidence
Landier, Augustin; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimism on financial contracting and corporate performance. Optimism may increase effort, but is bad for adaptation decisions as the entrepreneur underweights negative information. The first-best contract with an optimist uses contingencies to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136697