We provide the first direct empirical support for the relevance of signalling in monetary policy. In our dynamic model, central bankers make policy under uncertain inflationary conditions and place different weights on output fluctuations. Signalling leads all bankers to be tougher on inflation...

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect the deliberation of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (particularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the...

This paper presents a model of monetary policy-making in a federal monetary union. Central bank council members are representatives from the member states. In a repeated-game context, council members have an incentive to engage in strategic voting, trading political favours between each other....

In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization...

Historical experience suggests that the distribution of monetary policy authority among the members of a monetary union is a key aspect of the design of a central bank constitution. We analyse alternative institutional solutions to that problem with different degrees of centralization of...

The paper advances a simple and tractable Wicksellian model of inflation, in which the price level is determined by the interaction of the nominal rate of return on capital with a rule that governs the interest rate at which the Central Bank supplies money, and in which the equality of the...

This paper is an attempt to provide an updated assessment of what we know and what do not know about the impact of monetary policy on the economy and what implications follow for the conduct of monetary policy in today's world. Firstly, we discuss the conditions under which monetary policy can...

In this paper we study the relationship between labour market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labour institutions (labour adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigidity) and social preferences...

The translation of legal independence into actual independence is primarily determined by the rule of law. Inspired by the economic growth literature, where the role of institutions already is incorporated, we introduce Institutional Quality Indicators that can be used as reasonable proxies for...

This paper examines five bubbles that eventually popped, and discuses the feasibility of central bank policy. In all cases, we find that monetary policy was too loose during the period when the bubble was developing, and that a determined switch from an accommodating to a tight stance caused...