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Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

To stay on top of global competition, firms and governments often need to acquire innovative goods and services, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Effective Political Contests

Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366

Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504495

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545

All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454

Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions

Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485

Optimal Rewards in Contests

Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501

Contests with Ties

Cohen, Daniel; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524

Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?

Lalive, Rafael; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Public agencies rely on two key modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. The relative advantages of these two modes are still imperfectly understood. This paper therefore studies public procurement of regional passenger railway services in Germany, where regional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275960

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