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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231
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Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful
Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We exploit an incentive change in professional soccer leagues aimed at encouraging more attacking and goal scoring to obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of the same teams in a competition that experienced no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114301
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Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
objective outcome but only the consumer’s report, or subjective evaluation. A failure of the low-cost treatment delays the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084241
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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433
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Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080
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Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
Cai, Hongbin; Li, Hongbin; Park, Albert; Zhou, Li-An - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468597
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Why organizations fail: models and cases
Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
-termism, both of which are instances of 'multitasking problems'; communication failures in the presence of both soft and hard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165668
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The Quality of Entrepreneurs
Hvide, Hans K - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
What determines the quality of entrepreneurs? To address this question, the paper proposes a simple model of the interaction between individual workers’ decision to become entrepreneurs and established firms’ effort to keep their best workers and ideas. The main prediction from the model is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792326
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Travel Demand Model with Heterogeneous Users and Endogenous Congestion: An application to optimal pricing of bus services
Batarce, Marco; Ivaldi, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have heterogeneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493565
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Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
Philippon, Thomas; Skreta, Vasiliki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468692