This paper describes the way in which the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England conducted monetary policy since the beginning of the financial crisis, in August 2007. We argue that both quantitative easing - and the other non-standard measures introduced by...

Standard accounts of the Great Depression attribute an important causal role to monetary policy errors in accounting for the catastrophic collapse in economic activity observed in the early 1930s. While views vary on the relative importance of money versus credit contraction in the propagation...

This paper provides an appraisal of European Central Bank (ECB) policy from the beginning of the financial crisis to the summer of 2014. It argues that, as the crisis unfolded, ECB policy can be characterized as an attempt at finding a middle way between “monetary dominance” embedded in the...

This paper analyses the impact on the macroeconomy of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy implemented in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the Fall of 2008. We study in particular the effect of the expansion of the intermediation of transactions across central bank balance...