We examine a model of R&D competition and cooperation in the presence of spillovers. Unlike virtually all the literature, however, we treat these spillovers as endogenous and under the control of firms. We show that it is then essential to make a number of distinctions that are ignored in the...

The paper presents a theoretical analysis of the relationship between privatization and public deficit finance. We examine the optimal magnitude of public asset sales and the extent to which privatization can be used to reduce taxes, or, to retire public debt, for two cases. In the first,...

Emission taxes under oligopoly with both fixed number and endogenous market structure (perhaps the most relevant market structures for policy issues) are examined. In the latter case, and contrary to what is expected under imperfect competition, the optimal tax could exceed marginal external...

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...

The outcome of technological competition between firms (or countries) depends on the resolution of two forces: the profit incentive and the competitive threat. This is illustrated using a simple duopoly model. This model is then used to analyze two policy issues: subsidizing R & D and...

We evaluate the social welfare loss (WL) that arises in an oligopolistic industry under technological competition and product differentiation. The main novelty of our approach concerns the decomposition of the WL into `dynamic' losses (from too little cost reduction and an inappropriate number...