This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in...

The success or failure of the fight against tax havens is the outcome of a coordination game between a tax haven and its potential investors. Key determinants are the costly international pressure and the haven country's revenue pool. The latter is determined endogenously by the decisions of...

We develop an estimator of unreported income that relies on much more flexible identifying assumptions than those underlying previous estimators of the shadow economy using household-level data. Assuming only that evading households have a higher consumption-income gap than non-evaders in...

Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement agents, etc.). Not much is known either normatively about the best way to incentivize atomistic auditors, nor positively about what these incentives actually look like in real...

People may express their political opinion by adopting different measures of civil disobedience. Tax compliance is an example of an economic decision that may be affected by anti-goverment sentiment. We consider a model in which political opinion as well as tax compliance decisions are both...

We study the effects of patriotism on tax compliance. If individuals feel a (random) patriotic warm glow from honest tax compliance, this has implications for optimal auditing and tax compliance. A higher expected warm glow reduces the government's optimal audit probability and yields higher tax...

The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals differing in their willingness to pay for a taxed good vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot...

A key open question in economics is the practical, portable modeling of bounded rationality. In this short note, I report on ongoing progress that is more fully developed elsewhere. I present some results from a new model with boundedly rational features in which the decision-maker (DM) builds a...

We model the link between inequality and excessive risk taking. In the presence of increasing returns to tax avoidance, the middle class is willing to take non rewarded financial risk despite risk aversion. Electoral pressure may lead an incumbent politician to endorse this excessive risk taking...

We consider a lie-catching experiment with 9240 judgements. A set of videotapes shows subjects participating in a tax compliance experiment. The subjects chose whether or not to misreport. Subjects knew that underreporters were chosen for an audit with some probability. An audit led to detection...