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Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest

Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

the seller’s relative bargaining power and bargaining share. This in turn fosters the seller’s incentives to invest even …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871

Hold-Up, Industrial Relations and Takeover Threats

Chemla, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

dramatically affect the way in which an increase in workers' bargaining power affects (under)investment. Without loss of generality … takeovers, the higher workers' bargaining power, the higher their wage flexibility and effort and the firm's capacity to invest …' effort and wage flexibility are restricted and decrease with the workers' initial bargaining power. Various takeover defence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656178

Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We … explore the implications of using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. A prominent finding regarding the suboptimality of … to give ownership to a party whose investments are less productive, provided that this party's ex-post bargaining power …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084329

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400

Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production

Antràs, Pol - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320400

Global Sourcing of a Complex Good

Van Biesebroeck, Johannes; Zhang, Lijun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze a firm that produces a final good from multiple intermediates that can each be sourced domestically or from a low-wage country. The model explicitly incorporates that sourcing decisions of intermediates are interdependent. Equilibrium predictions depend crucially on a key modeling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324256

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Consider a seller and a buyer who write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458298

Private States and the Enforcement of Property Rights - Theory and Evidence on the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Bandiera, Oriana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia initially developed to protect land from predatory attacks, at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common-agency model, the Paper shows that: (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662056

Project Evaluation and Organizational Form

Gehrig, Thomas; Régibeau, Pierre; Rockett, Katharine - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper analyses the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by innovations. It is assumed that consumers have hierarchic preferences. As a result inequality affects demand and therefore the incentive to innovate. Whether more inequality is harmful or beneficial for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662076

Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation with Quadratic Costs

Van Zandt, Timothy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper presents a model in which boundedly rational members of an administrative staff calculate resource allocations in real time. We consider a class of hierarchical procedures in which information about payoff functions flows up and is aggregated by a hierarchy, while allocations flow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662081

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