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shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a … consequences of activism. More recent models show that blockholders can govern through the alternative mechanism of “exit … governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084247
This paper analyses the effects of scope expansion on the core activity of banks and provides a rationale for their interest in offering a wider product range. We show that scope economies may stem from moral hazard in the core business, and argue that a cost of scope expansion might be the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791861
This paper analyzes the consequences of bank diversification into fee-based businesses. Universal banks raise welfare by expanding the range of services available to entrepreneurs. However, because they may choose to rescue failed entrepreneurs in order to sell them fee-based financial services,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792170
We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114250
We propose and test a simple explanation for institutional investors’ tendency to chase return trends. When investors face uncertainty about the precision of their private information, they wait for subsequent confirming news before establishing stock positions. While such news impact the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083728
exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled … that they are incompetent and when board power has increased following corporate governance reforms. In contrast, CEOs are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717
We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in counteracting costly shareholder risk-shifting incentives during severe financial distress, when job-loss may be imminent. We examine this argument empirically using bankruptcy filings in Sweden,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123993
We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799
This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms …. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this … need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark, the blockholder governs through exit, selling her stake if the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084086