We report on six large-scale financial markets experiments that were designed to test two of the most basic propositions of modern asset pricing theory, namely, that the interaction between risk averse agents in a competitive market leads to equilibration, and that, in equilibrium, risk premia...

The theory and the data in this Paper challenge the view that there is no structure in prices and allocations when markets are off equilibrium. Starting from the observation that price-taking usually applies only to small orders, a theory of equilibration is derived based on the assumption that...

We consider the debt capacity of a risky asset when debt is being rolled over and there is a liquidation cost in case of default. We show that debt capacity depends on how information about the quality of the asset is revealed. When the information structure is based on “optimistic”...

We study IPOs by focusing on the degree of portfolio diversification of the shareholders taking the company public. We argue that a less diversified shareholder has more to gain from taking the company public and would be more willing to accept a lower price for the sale of its shares, i.e....

We analyse dynamic financial contracting under moral hazard. The ability to rely on future rewards relaxes the tension between incentive and participation constraints, relative to the static case. Managers are incited by the promise of future payments after several successes and the threat of...

This paper provides a theory of foreign equity investment restrictions. We consider a model where the demand function for domestic shares differs between domestic and foreign investors because of dead-weight costs in holding domestic and foreign securities that depend on the country of residence...

We incorporate costly external finance in a production based asset pricing model and investigate whether financing frictions are quantitatively important for pricing a cross-section of expected returns. We show that the common assumptions about the nature of the financing frictions are captured...

Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by...

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms can choose to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR activities as an investment in customer loyalty and show that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value. These effects are stronger...