Showing 1 - 10 of 401
This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114474
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196032
We introduce endogenous political parties into the Hotelling-Downs voting framework to model the selection of candidates. First, activists choose which party to join, if at all. Second, party members select a champion for the general election. Third, the electorate median voter determines the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084416
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251
I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792030
In this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123705
We compare the behaviour of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123765
This short paper analyses the tension between "widening" and "deepening" of organizations such as the European Union. Members have the same consumption benefit of reform but weak and strong members differ in their cost of exerting reform efforts. As decisions are taken by unanimity, the reform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504398
The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730
What are the effects of institutional subversion on small business development, fiscal policies, economic growth, and firm performance? This Paper provides an empirical investigation of institutional subversion in Russia’s regions. We develop a complete account of preferential treatments to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114295