This paper studies dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other’s purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information increases...

According to the favorite-longshot bias observed in pari-mutuel betting, the final distribution of bets overestimates the winning chance of longshots. This Paper proposes an explanation of this bias based on late betting by small privately informed bettors. These bettors have an incentive to...

This Paper studies the private incentives and the social effects of horizontal mergers among risk-averse firms. In our model, merging firms are allowed to choose how to split their joint profits, with implications for risk sharing and strategic behaviour in the product market. If firms compete...

We analyze the interaction between financial institutions' internal compensation policy, the quality of loans, and their securitization decision. We also assess the case for requiring financial institutions to defer bonus pay so as to make incentives more commensurate with the longer-term risk...

Why do people trade? Because they are told to! Using a unique dataset from a large German bank, we find that retail investors who report that they rely heavily on their advisors’ recommendations have a substantially higher trading volume and purchase a higher fraction of investment products...

Our paper examines the effect of recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses for compensation contracts in the financial sector. We study a multi-task setting in which a bank employee, the agent, privately chooses (deal or customer) acquisition...

We introduce professional financial advice in households’ choice to hold risky financial assets. Consistent with the predictions from a formal model, we present evidence that households’ trust in financial advice only matters when their perceived own financial capability is low. Instead, for...

In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" through choosing high target leverage or "debt capacity" through choosing low target leverage. Thereby, firms reduce a problem of underinvestment or overinvestment when they must raise future...

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Savings accounts are owned by most households, but little is known about the performance of households’ investments. We create a unique dataset by matching information on individual savings accounts from the DNB Household Survey with market data on account-specific interest rates and...