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Gilbert, Richard; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

Setting a price that results in rationing may be optimal for a seller whose customers must make a specific investment … to be able to use his product. Although rationing results in <MI>ex post<D> inefficiency, the resulting distribution of … higher profits than with market-clearing prices. Committing to a single price, and rationing if there is excess demand, can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788950

Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. Dominant investors can influence information collection in the financial market, and thereby corporate transparency, by affecting market liquidity or the cost of information collection. More transparency on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114392

Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976788

The Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing: Pricing Styles in the Concert Industry

Courty, Pascal; Pagliero, Mario - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We document the existence of pricing styles in the concert industry. Artists differ in the extent to which they rely on second- and third-degree price discrimination and in how likely they are to sell out concerts. Most strikingly, artists who use multiple seating categories are more likely to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084535

Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK

Brennan, Michael J; Franks, Julian R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

the United Kingdom, we argue that IPO underpricing is used to ensure over-subscription and rationing in the share …) and how the underpricing of the issue can be used by insiders to retain control. Using data from a sample of 69 IPOs in … evidence in the paper suggests that rationing in the IPO discriminates against applicants who apply for large blocks, and that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666807

Tax Arbitrage with Risk and Effort Aversion -- Swedish Lottery Bonds 1970-1990

Rydqvist, Kristian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Swedish lottery bonds are valuable tax shelters before the tax reform of 1991. By trading around the coupon lottery, high-tax investors with capital gains from the stock market shift their tax liability to low-tax investors. The uncertainty of the coupon lottery and the effort of verifying the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468526

Platform Ownership

Nocke, Volker; Peitz, Martin; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. There also may be free entry into the market for platform slots, or platform...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662172

Intermediation and Investment Incentives

Belleflamme, Paul; Peitz, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze whether and how the fact that products are not sold on open or public platforms but on competing for-profit platforms affects sellers’ investment incentives. Investments in cost reduction, quality, or marketing measures are here the joint and coordinated efforts by sellers. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789005

Bilateral Oligopoly

Björnerstedt, Jonas; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings between pairs of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789066

Transparency, Prices and Welfare with Imperfect Substitutes

Boone, Jan; Potters, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Markets that are not completely transparent feature complex comparative statics with respect to the effect of number of firms, elasticity of substitution between goods and degree of transparency on equilibrium prices. The main result is that the following 'common wisdom' is incorrect: more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791681

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