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Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?

Lalive, Rafael; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Public agencies rely on two key modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. The relative … passenger railway services in Germany, where regional agencies can use auctions and negotiations to procure regional passenger … auctions. This analysis suggests accounting for the endogeneity of the choice of procurement mode by estimating the mode of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275960

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795

Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions …. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions …. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading ‘How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123523

When are Auctions Best?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123726

The Microstructure of the Euro Money Market

Hartmann, Philipp; Manna, Michele; Manzanares, Andres - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper provides the first empirical examination of the microstructure of the euro money market, using tick data from brokers located in six countries. Special emphasis is put on the institutional environment (monetary policy decisions and their implementation, payment systems and private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123983

How to Win Twice at an Auction: On the Incidence of Commissions in Auction Markets

Ginsburgh, Victor; Legros, Patrick; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We analyse the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. We argue that while commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers the question of incidence deserves a new treatment in auction markets. We show that an increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136415

Toeholds and Takeovers

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Huang, Ming; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ‘toehold’ bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136550

Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions

Mikusheva, Anna; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study the impact of information revelation on efficiency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067415

The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions

Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper introduces and formally models the variable value environment, where bidders' private values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks. Examples of private actions and exogenous shocks are complementary investments and exogenous changes in bidder's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067420