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Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. Conventional wisdom associates the gains from trade with comparative advantage in manufacturing or marketing. We show that these gains imply that patent transactions should increase litigation risk. We identify a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322505

Patent Suits: Do They Distort Research Incentives?

Lanjouw, Jenny; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

important. We use this empirical evidence to examine hypotheses about the determinants of patent suits. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124091

Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights

Miller, Marcus; Thomas, Dania - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What are the implications for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking capital gains and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067444

Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504638

Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures

Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the … conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low … procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504723

Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

Plaintiffs have either strong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needs additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney’s recommendation. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114498

Bite the Bullet: Trade Retaliation, EU Jurisprudence and the Law and Economics of ‘Taking One for the Team’

Hoekman, Bernard; Mavroidis, Petros C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper discusses the Fedon case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which involved a claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eye glass cases) from the EU for the imposition of WTO-authorized retaliatory trade barriers by the United States following the failure by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084063

Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts

Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Cumulative innovation is central to economic growth. Do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow-on innovation? This paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent, as measured by later citations. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084087

Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084598

Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization

Gennaioli, Nicola; Perotti, Enrico C; Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use of innovative contracts and legal evolution that improve verifiability and contracting over time. We find, however, that the cost of judicial bias also grows over time because...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084669