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We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our Paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124218
Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528530
We analyse the consumption strategy of a dynamically inconsistent individual for goods that provide an immediate benefit and a delayed cost. The agent has incomplete information on the cost inherent to each unit of consumption and partially learns this value anytime he consumes. We show that, by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504250
. We consider a dynamic game in which firms improve both a new and a rival old technology while learning about the relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504449
the Phillips curve the less does optimal policy aim towards learning. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497983
We analyse households’ responses to an unanticipated change in consumption opportunities and evaluate their implications for the nature and formation of preferences. We study the tariff experiment conducted by South Central Bell where local telephone measured tariffs were introduced for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498107
We introduce learning into a Hotelling model of a non-renewable resource market. By combining learning and scarcity we … add significantly to the dynamics implied by learning and substantially enhance the volatility of commodity prices. In our … learning model we show how a self confirming equilibrium exists but is not constant over time. As scarcity increases the SCE …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973966
We study dynamic moral hazard where principal and agent are symmetrically uncertain about job difficulty. Since effort is unobserved, shirking leads the principal to believe that the job is hard, increasing the agent's continuation value. So deterring shirking requires steeper incentives, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083528
model combining the learning aspect of experience goods with reference-dependent preferences, we setup a field experiment in … Northern Uganda in which three health products differing in their scope for learning were initially offered either for free or … for sale at market prices. In line with prior studies, when the product has potential for positive learning, we do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083717
We study dynamic moral hazard, with symmetric ex ante uncertainty and learning. Unlike Holmstrom's career concerns …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083746