: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects …

. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust … destabilize and deter cartels by (a) protecting agents that defect (and report) from fines; (b) protecting them from other agents …

This paper provides an analysis of factors facilitating or hindering collusion using data on the occurrence of price …-fixing across UK manufacturing industries in the 1950s. The econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the … relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion is non-monotonic. Less clear results are obtained with respect …

formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both …-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime. …

to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. …

Many convicted cartels have a leader which is substantially larger than its rivals. In a setting where firms face … indivisible costs of collusion, we show that: (i) firms may have an incentive to merge so as to create asymmetric market … higher risk of collusion. Thus, these results have implications for the practice of the current EU and US merger policies. …

The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical … discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial … fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs …

We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to … firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may …

We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of … organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization …. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find …