Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector …) higher ability increases quality directly and indirectly (through a lower marginal cost of quality); b) the provider can game … impact on quality, quality effort is lower and distortions from informational rents are higher; under some conditions more …

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public … increasing, the steady state quality is higher under the open- loop solution than under the closed-loop solution. Fiercer … competition (lower transportation costs and/or less sluggish demand) leads to higher quality in both solutions, but the quality …

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public … utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the … the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution: in fact, quality …

The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on … between hospitals. Patients were given choice of location for hospital care and provided information on the quality and …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effoort when their budgets are soft … state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer … budgets increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

performance, productivity, waiting times and clinical quality and find little evidence that mergers achieved gains other than a …

improve quality is that providers will face higher demand if they improve their quality. We test this crucial assumption in an … family doctor practices. We find that patients do respond to quality: a one standard deviation increase in a publicly … available measure of clinical quality would increase the number of patients a practice would attract by around 15%. …

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two … dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2 … quality 1 increases or decreases the provider's marginal disutility and the patients' marginal benefit from quality 2 (i …