This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers … provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers’ private information is … multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behaviour and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate …

, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make … potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their …

simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The … sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction …

buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can … auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue. A substantially revised …

The design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of contractors among distinct technological groups …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …

This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms in a setting where the procurement agency has incomplete information … parameter, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a simple auction. If first best welfare is U-shaped in type, the optimal …

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the first-price multi-unit auction. It is … motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on … welfare consequences of allowing combination bidding in the first price auction are ambiguous, and depend on the importance of …