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Tips and Tells from Managers: How Analysts and the Market Read Between the Lines of Conference Calls
Druz, Marina; Wagner, Alexander F; Zeckhauser, Richard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. “Tone surprise” -- the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm’s recent economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145406
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Mergers as Auctions
Ivaldi, Marc; Motis, Jrissy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
structural approach to infer acquirers’ gains from merging by interpreting a merger as an auction. Using nonparametric methods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656211
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Distressed Acquisitions
Meier, Jean-Marie A.; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Firms that buy distressed and bankrupt companies or some of these companies’ assets earn excess returns that are at least 1.6 percentage points higher than when they make regular acquisitions. These returns come at the expense of the target firm’s shareholders, while overall wealth gains are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083439
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Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on … to proxy fights alone but also to takeover bids alone. Finally, we show that, when acquisition offers are in the form of … US over poison pills and in Europe over the new EEC directive on takeovers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692
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The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support – boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The Paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124408
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The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger
Clougherty, Joseph A.; Duso, Tomaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger between competitor firms. We instead argue … that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert … merger announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger events is not sensitive to merger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123810
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Bottom-Up Corporate Governance
Landier, Augustin; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate governance. We provide robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136453
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Industry Concentration and Welfare - On the Use of Stock Market Evidence from Horizontal Mergers
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anticompetitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497962
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Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months
Edmans, Alex; Goncalves-Pinto, Luis; Wang, Yanbo; Xu, Moqi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We show that CEOs strategically time corporate news releases to coincide with months in which their equity vests. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. CEOs reallocate news into vesting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084526
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Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage
Edmans, Alex; Goldstein, Itay; Jiang, Wei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises because firm value is endogenous to the exploitation of arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. While this feedback effect increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084724