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A Theory of Political Transitions
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly for the elite, highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661707
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Democracy and Foreign Education
Spilimbergo, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Do foreign educated individuals play a role in promoting democracy in their home country? Despite the large amount of … foster democracy in their home countries. Using a unique panel dataset on foreign students starting from 1950, I show that … indeed foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home country, but only if the foreign education is acquired in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791894
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Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes
Conconi, Paola; DeRemer, David; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276379
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Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution
Klor, Esteban F; Shayo, Moses - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114256
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On Income Inequality and Green Preferences
Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We derive conditions of individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662063
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Inequality and Growth
Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
capital markets theories. It allows for departures from perfect democracy and embodies the trade-off between the growth costs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123982
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On Income Inequality and Democracy: Theories and Findings in Search of a Viable Data Base.
Castles, F.G. - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 1996
democracy and to assess the prospects of future research in the area. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977275
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To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy
de la Croix, David; Doepke, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The governments of nearly all countries are major providers of primary and secondary education to their citizens. In some countries, however, public schools coexist with private schools, while in others the government is the sole provider of education. In this study, we ask why different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124295
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Inefficient Redistribution
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
where; (1) the political influence of a group depends on its size, and (2) political institutions cannot credibly commit to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067380
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Elections, Contracts and Markets
Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067506