We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate. We analyze...

We develop a model of information exchange between calling parties. We characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks compete for such users by charging both for outgoing and incoming calls. We show that networks have reduced incentives to use off-net price discrimination to...

The paper provides policymakers and regulators with an overview of the more relevant theoretical issues related to the pricing of access to ensure that the political debate around practical concerns is solidly grounded. The paper discusses in detail the importance of access pricing in the...

We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery) whereas passive waste does not (as in the case of inefficiency due to red tape). To assess the...

This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. Many countries have traditionally allowed owners of intellectual property rights to prohibit arbitrage in the face of international price discrimination. In a well-known paper...

Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after liberalization and the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to...

Most of the contest literature deals with first prizes; this Paper deals with the optimality of second prizes. We show that in a three-person contest where one contestant is very strong a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant....

This paper analyzes the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over both a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). A model with two firms competing over locations and non-linear contracts is analyzed. Discriminatory contracts...

This Paper addresses the question of third-degree price discrimination in input markets. I propose a solution that relies on a method that decomposes the upstream monopolist’s profit into two parts, one that depends on average input prices, and one that depends on their distribution. I am able...

This Paper tests the presence of multiple independent submarkets in the Italian motor insurance industry. Independence is motivated by administrative boundaries among provinces and by further locational reasons. We find that the independence effects are sufficient to induce a minimum degree of...