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Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136516

How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792107

Does austerity pay off?

Born, Benjamin; Müller, Gernot; Pfeifer, Johannes - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We ask whether cuts of government consumption lower or raise the sovereign default premium. To address this question, we set up a new data set for 38 emerging and advanced economies which contains quarterly time-series observations for sovereign default premia, government consumption, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168905

Skewness in Stock Returns, Periodic Cash Payouts, and Investor Heterogeneity

Albuquerque, Rui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of periodic cash payouts within the context of a stationary rational expectations model with heterogeneous investors. The periodicity of cash payouts provides a natural motivation for time-varying conditional volatility in stock returns. I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491716

Men at Work in a Land Down-under

Booth, Alison; Katic, Pamela - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2008

We use new training data from waves 3-6 of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey to investigate the training and wages of full-time men. We explore the extent to which the data are consistent with the predictions of human capital theory or with recent alternative theories...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004971374

Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of Unemployment

Güell, Maia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts. Since then their labour markets have become more dynamic. This Paper studies the implications of such reforms for the duration distribution of unemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the duration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123695

The Effects of Globalization on Worker Training

Gersbach, Hans; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We examine how globalization affects firms’ incentives to provide general worker training. We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, firms invest in productivity-enhancing training. In stage 2, they can make wage offers for each others’ workers. Finally, Cournot competition takes place....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124275

Momentum and Turnover: Evidence from the German Stock Market

Glaser, Markus; Weber, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

previous three to 12 months and sell stocks with low returns over the same period) and turnover (number of shares traded … more profitable among high-turnover stocks. In contrast to US evidence, this result is driven mainly by winners: high-turnover … winners have higher returns than low-turnover winners. We present various robustness checks, long-horizon results, evidence on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136650

A Product Market Theory of Worker Training

Gersbach, Hans; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each other’s trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498011

Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information

Novaes, Walter; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504447